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Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I owe a debt of
gratitude to G. Blaine Baker, who read a draft of this paper with care, and made many valuable
suggestions. I also owe many thanks to Allan Hutchinson, with whom I have discussed the
ideas in this article, as well as a variety of others, whose healthy skepticism at presentations
both sides of the border helped me to refine my ideas.
This article is the first in a series of inquiries into Canadian constitutional culture by this
author.
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To think of the U.S. is to think of ourselves - almost

I. INTRODUCTION

The fifth anniversary of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
came and went on 17 April 1987 with little fanfare. In 1982,
buoyant optimism greeted the Charter and most exalted our

acquisition of "fundamental rights." Just five years later, a brooding
skepticism has intruded. Those who registered their opposition from
the start 2 have been joined by others who denigrate the Charter as
a regressive documentO Still others initially mesmerized by the
prospect of "constitutional
rights" have now expressed misgivings
4
Charter.
the
about
Adding to this disquiet, the Supreme Court of Canada's
decisions reflect a worrying uncertainty about the Charter. Already,

the Court's jurisprudence has shifted dramatically from an early
attitude of confident "interventionism" to a more recent posture of

deferential "restraint."5 Like others, the Supreme Court appears ill
1

G. Grant, "From Roosevelt to L.BJ." in A. Purdy, ed., The New Romans: Candid
CanadianOpinions of the U.S. (Edmonton: M.G. Hurtig, 1968) 39 at 39.
2See, for example, R. Macdonald, "Postcript and Prelude - the Jurisprudence of the
Charter Eight Theses" (1982) 4 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 321, and H. Glasbeek and M. Mandel, "'he
Legalization of Politics in Advanced Capitalism: The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms" (1984) 2 Socialist Studies 84.
3See,for example, A. Hutchinson, "Charter Litigation and Social Change" in IL Sharpe, cd.,
CharterLitigation (Toronto: Butterworths, 1987) 357; A. Petter, "The Politics of the Charter"
(1986) 8 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 473; and A. Hutchinson and A. Petter, "Private Rights/Public Wrongs:
The Liberal Lie of the Charter" (1987) 38 U. Toronto L.J. [forthcoming].
4See, for example, R. Fulford, "Charter of Wrongs" Saturday Night (December 1986) 7
(lamenting the Charter's americanization of our Constitution, and our failure to recognize this
inevitability in time).
5The two Sunday closing decisions supply persuasive evidence of this shift. In R. v. Big M
DntgMart[1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, the Supreme Court invalidated federal Sunday closing legislation,
making little or no effort to uphold it under section 1. In doing so, the Court concluded that
the law was coercive, and imposed an intolerable burden on religious freedom. Less than two
years later, EdwardsBooks andArt Ltd v. Regina [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, upheld provincial Sunday
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at ease with the Charter. 6

If

unsatisfying,

understandable.

the

Court's

equivocation

is

at

least

Because individuals can now challenge state

7
authority through the courts, the Charter aggrandizes the judiciary.
In such circumstances, it would be unrealistic to expect the Supreme
Court to assemble a theory of institutional role overnight. Justice
Gerald V. LaForest has candidly admitted that the Court is "still
groping": in his words, "[w]hen you are dealing with the Charter,
8
you really don't know which path to choose."
As it gropes for direction, the Court will be hindered by the
Charter's origins. By entrenching individual rights, the Charter
imports an ideology which is decidedly American. 9 Adopting that
ideology after almost two hundred years of evolution has made the
mass of American experience impossible to ignore, but impossible to
digest. Nonetheless, daunting as it may seem, the logistical problem

closing legislation as "business" regulation warranting a less exacting section 1 analysis. Though
it is possible to tease distinctions from the facts, these decisions cannot be easily reconciled.
When other Supreme Court Charter decisions are considered alongside, a shift in attitude
toward judicial review becomes difficult, if not impossible, to deny. Compare Hunterv. Southain
hc. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145; Reference reSection 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.) [1985] 2 S.C.IR
486; and R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; with Jones v. The Queen [1986] 2 S.C.R 284; Retail,
Wholesale andDep't Store Union v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573; Reference re Public
Service Employee RelationsAct (Alta.) [1987] 1 S.C.R 313; Public ServiceAlliance of Canadav.
The Queen [1987] 1 S.C.RL 424; Retail, Wholeseale andDep't Store Union v.A-G ofSaskatchewan
[1987] 1 S.C.RI 460; and Reference re Bill30, An Act to Amend the EducationAct (Ont.) [1987]
1 S.C.R. 1148.
6Its decision in R. v. Morgentaler [1988] 1 S.C.R. 3, rendered after this article was written,
does not change my assessment of the Supreme Court's Charter interpretation. For a brief
elaboration, see J. Cameron, "Difficult to see criteria S.C.C. uses for decision" Vol. 7, No. 44
The Laiiyers Weekly (25 March 1984) 4.
7
Traditional review provided a limited forum in which individuals could challenge the state's
authority through the constitutional division of powers, or pursuant to the federal Bill of
Rights statute. They could only challenge that authority, qua individuals, in eases of
interference with language and denominational school rights. See infra, note 60.
8

K Makin, "Charter's Mandate Gives Judges Role as Wary Surgeons" The [Toronto] Globe

and Mail (14 April 1987) 8.
9
Because it gives individuals rights which can be asserted against the state and are enforced
by the judiciary, the Charter rests on ideological concepts that are distinctly American. Although
the Charter's text may resemble international and European covenants establishing protection
for "human rights," those documents are themselves the offspring of American constitutional
ideology. See infra, note 54 and accompanying text.
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of accessing American doctrine is perhaps the Court's easiest task.1 0
Additionally, the Court must also assess the relevance of u.s.
jurisprudence from an ideological perspective. Here the quandary
arises because American bill of rights jurisprudence is essentially
foreign: the Charter's mandate of rights review is unfamiliar, and
11
conflicts with values deeply rooted in Canadian constitutionalism.
At the same time, however, the Charter's conceptual origins are
unavoidable, and to enforce its guarantees, the Court has been
obliged, whether consciously or not, to assimilate some of the
substantive values
and institutional norms of American
constitutionalism. Given these problems, it is hardly surprising that
the judiciary's discussions of U.S. doctrine have often been
ambivalent.
Instead of signalling any particular reaction to
American jurisprudence, this equivocation reveals the Court's own
12
diffidence about the institutional role it has been directed to play.
Indeed, the chasm separating the Supreme Court's early
interventions from its more recent restraint points out the dilemma
inherent in Canada's new constitutionalism. A tension between the
Charter's directive to the judiciary to protect individuals from the
state, and a tradition of parliamentary supremacy, which recognized
virtually no such claim, is patent. Obliged to exercise a "yankee"
imperative of review, the Supreme Court is unsure whether to
1On virtually every issue, the jurisprudence is diffuse and obtuse. In addition, the case
law can only be understood in the context of its evolution and relationship to the broader
scheme of review. In any case, therefore, a Canadian court could only feel confident applying
American doctrine to the Charter after conducting a far-reaching and time-consuming inquiry.
Despite those difficulties, ignoring American doctrine is not the answer, see, infra, note 12.
!!Rights review is inconsistent with parliamentary sovereignty, which, without doubt, is one
of the core values of Canada's traditional constitutional ideology. Though judicial review and
parliamentary sovereignty co-existed prior to the Charter, the power of review was limited to
questions concerning the division of powers and did not extend independently to issues about
relations between individuals and the state. See, hifra, note 60.
12

The Court fears that by relying heavily on American doctrine, it may compromise the
Charter as an expression of Canadian values. Despite that risk, the judiciary cannot ignore the
institutional questions which will inevitably accompany the Charter by declaring American
experience irrelevant. See, for example, The B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486,
in which the Court dismissed the controversy surrounding substantive due process, despite its
relevance to the interpretation of section 7 and the broader legitimacy of review. For a critique
of this decision, see J. Cameron, "The Motor Vehicle Reference and the Relevance of American
doctrine in Charter Adjudication" in Sharpe, supra, note 3 at 69 and P. Monahan and A. Petter,
"Developments in Constitutional Law- The 1985-86 Term" (1987) 9 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 69 at 78102.
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embrace the creeds of American constitutionalism, or otherwise
stand aloof, claiming fidelity to the tenets of pre-Charter
constitutional ideology. As a result, the Court is ambivalent, and
until it develops a sense of institutional role its jurisprudence will
remain uncertain.
Whichever direction the Supreme Court chooses, its decisions
should be informed. As James Landis declared in the 1930s, when
American constitutional ideology was in upheaval, the sense of
confusion prevailing at that time flowed from the fact that "too little
delineating of our political ideology has taken place."13 Five years
ago, Canada succumbed to the hypnotic spell of constitutional rights
without appreciating the consequences of doing so. This article
does not undertake to explain the Charter's genesis, but it does
suggest that for years, Canada has been susceptible to the romantic
appeal of American constitutional ideology. In part because we
understood so little about it, we embraced the Charter on the
strength of a series of misperceptions about "rights review." Even so,
in rethinking our ideology with the Charter in place, it would be
mistaken for us to engage in too obsessive a dissection of American
constitutionalism. Our task today is to focus attention on the
delineation of indigenous values.
Nonetheless, because of the Charter's ideological origins, our
ability to fashion a role which avoids producing a "bad copy"14 of
U.S. jurisprudence will depend, in some part, on our perception of
that ideology. For that reason, this article is not about Canadian
constitutionalism.
Instead of discussing indigenous values or
proposing a theory of institutional role,
it offers a critical overview
15
of American constitutional ideology

13Quoted in M. Kammen, Spheres of Liberty: ChangingPerceptionsof Liberty in American

Culture (U.S.A.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986) at 132. These changes are described
infra, at notes 145-48 and 154-55, and accompanying text.
!See,
15

infra, note 184.

1n discussing this ideology from the revolutionary era to the present, I necessarily advance

propositions which may be disputed in the broader literature. Though it would have been
impossible to canvas all the scholarship in an article of this kind, skeptical readers should
remember that this sketch is drawn exclusively from mainstream American commentaries. It
is effectively an American self-portrait - one outlined by Americans but traced and interpreted,
for Canadian purposes, by a Canadian. If it is a harsh portrayal, it is still one that is fair.

262
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This is a survey piece, but it is one that makes certain claims
about American constitutionalism. Its purpose is to disarm a
mythology which, as projected by Americans and absorbed
uncritically by others, has been indulged too long. First and
foremost, this paper is about the misperceptions an americanized
ideology of individual rights can generate. It contends that the
commentary on American constitutional ideology, both in the United
States and abroad, has been largely distorted by the romantic aura
which envelops discussion about constitutional rights and judicial
review. Once the reality of American constitutionalism is exposed,
both as experience and ideology, the fallacy of this romanticism
should become apparent. In truth, the ideology of constitutional
rights rests on a distrust of authority which is less than romantic,
deeply pessimistic, and distinctly American. Establishing that liberal
constitutionalism1 6 is based on a distrust of authority is the objective
of this paper.
In the end, my hope is that, even without any examination of
Canadian constitutional culture, this article will advance our
understanding of the Charter. It is time we recognize that, although
our interpretation of it must be distinctly Canadian, the Charter
itself is inescapably and irreversibly the offspring of American
constitutional ideology. As such, we should approach it with a
realistic understanding of that ideology. In order to give the
Charter an interpretation that is distinctly Canadian, we must first
free our minds of the misperceptions we hold about constitutional
rights and judicial review.
The article proceeds in six parts. Following this Introduction,
Part II describes the cult of the U.S. Constitution, then calls its
assumptions into question by exposing the gap between romanticized
accounts and the reality of constitutional experience. Once having
doubted American orthodoxy that the preservation of liberty
requires constitutional rights and judicial review, Part III examines
the idea of constitutional liberty. A brief comparison of British and
American conceptions of constitutional liberty establishes that, far
from representing abstract or immutable principles, the expression is
largely descriptive, drawing its definition from the historical, political,

16

For a definition, see, infra, note 54 and accompanying text.
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and cultural experiences of particular societies. In light of that
observation, Part IV explores the historical and jurisprudential roots
of American constitutional culture. This inquiry attempts to
understand why Americans define liberty so dogmatically in terms of
constitutional rights and judicial review, and to ascertain what the
institutional consequences of doing so have been. Part V offers
brief reflections on the requirements of liberty, and is followed by
a Conclusion which identifies the challenge we face in re-fashioning
Canadian ideology in the era of the Charter.
II. THE AMERICAN EPIC OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY

How eWily men satisfy themselves that the Constitution is exactly what they wish it
to be.

It is difficult, if not impossible, for Canadians to escape
America's unrelenting constitutional imperialism. Throughout this
past year of bicentenary celebrations, we have been constantly
reminded that the story of constitutional liberty in the United States
is an epic without equal. In this epic, the cast proclaims its unique
attachment to liberty values and asserts the ideological supremacy of
the u.s. Constitution.18 From the revolutionary era to the present,
this epic has presented a romanticized version of American
19
constitutional ideology.
The romance begins with the legacy of independence through
revolution. In defying colonial authority, Americans did not simply
declare their independence: they realized their destiny as

17
M. Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself: Tihe Constitution in American Culture
(New York: Alfred Knopf, 1986) frontispiece (quoting Justice Joseph Story, 1845).
15

Though the references are far too numerous to list, a statement made in 1986, at
celebrations to unveil the refurbished Statue of Liberty, captures the mood of this imperialism.
On 4 July 1986, Lee Iacocca, Chair of Chrysler Corp., announced that "today, we [Americans]
start the biggest celebration of liberty that this country, and in fact the world, has ever seen".
The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (4 July 1986) 1.
19
Without suggesting that this version is universally held or that America lacks a critical
tradition, what the next pages describe is the dominant romantic ideology, or the cult of the
Constitution, as it is sometimes called.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 25 No. 2

"emancipators of the world."20 In their Declaration of Independence,
the revolutionaries pronounced certain truths to be "self-evident": all
men are created equal, and possess unalienable rights to seek "life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 21 When colonial authority
threatened those ends, "the people" exercised their prerogative to
re-possess the natural rights they were denied through oppressive
imperial rule. According to the epic, the colonists fought the
Revolution to preserve liberty and equality, the cornerstone ideals
of American constitutionalism.
The struggle for independence created an icon in the concept
of a written constitution. 22
John Adams praised the u.s.
Constitution as "the greatest single effort of national deliberation
the world has ever seen, '"23 and Supreme Court Justice William
Johnson subsequently declared it "the most wonderful instrument
ever drawn by the hand of man."24 But Americans do not sanctify
their Constitution just because statesmen boast its greatness; they
idolize it, in large part, because the Constitution belongs to the
people. 25 It is a "political bible," an article of faith to be cherished

20L. Hartz, The Liberal Traditionin America (San Diego: HBJ Books, 1955) at 38. The
literature is replete with similar references. See, for example, B. Bailyn, The IdeologicalOrigins
of the American Revolution (U.S.A.: Harvard University Press, 1967) at 20 (quoting John
Adams, who declared that "America was designed by Providence for the theatre on which man
was to make his true figure, on which science, virtue, liberty, happiness, and glory were to exist
in peace"), and 160 (describing the Revolution as a battle by a "new, fresh, vigorous, and above
all morally regenerate people rising from obscurity to defend the battlements of liberty and
then in triumph standing forth, heartening and sustaining the cause of freedom everywhere").
21

See, infra, note 76.

22

Prior to emergence of the Constitution in 1787, the thirteen states were governed by the
Articles of Confederation. See, infra, notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
23(uoted in C. Rossiter, 1787: The Grand Convention (New York: Norton & Co., 1966)
at 11.
24Quoted in Kammen, supra, note 17 at 162.
25
Significantly, the Preamble states that "We the People ... do ordain and establish this
Constitution." For a brief description of the Constitution as a social contract, see, infra, note
112.
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and possessed by every American. 26 As Max Lerner observed,
"[e]very tribe needs its totem and its fetish, and the Constitution is
27

ours."

So convinced are Americans of the superiority of their
Constitution that they find it difficult to conceive of any other plan

for government. 28 In crisis, rather than take aim at a sacrosanct
document, it is characteristic to villify a President, the slaveholding
south, or Supreme Court decision-making. 29 Even when its
decisions are denounced, the Supreme Court, as guardian of the
Constitution, is effectively beyond politics. 0 In popular culture, the

Constitution "receive[s] an unquestioned homage for reasons quite

26

After describing the Pennsylvania Constitution in those terms, Thomas Paine noted,
"[s]carcely a family was without it." N. Adkins, ed., The Rights of Man (U.S.A.: Bobbs-Merrill
Co., 1953) at 137. The fictions that "the people" collectively created it and that they collectively
possess it, are two of the Constitution's enduring myths. Possession is still important in
American constitutional culture: as chairman of the Bicentennial Commission, one of former
Chief Justice Burger's goals was to place copies of the Constitution on the checkout counter
of every supermarket in the United States. "Quotes," A.BAJ. (1 March 1987) 31.
27"Constitution and Court as Symbols" (1937) 46 Yale LJ. 1290 at 1294. As he put it,
"[t]alk to men on the street, the men in the mines and factories and steel-mills and real-estate
offices and filling stations ... and you will ... find that [the] Constitution and Supreme Court are
symbols of an ancient sureness and a comforting stability." Ibid. at 1291.
28

1n a reflective speech about the bicentenary celebrations, Justice Thurgood Marshall
urged "sensitive understanding of the Constitution's inherent defects," instead of "a blind
pilgrimage to the shrine of the original document." Significantly, the published excerpt was
titled, "Celebrating the Constitution: A Dissent," Harper's (July 1987) 17.
29

For example, during the legal tenders crisis of the 1870s, an observer cynically inquired,
"[is there anyone for] throwing the Constitution overboard? Who would be outside Bedlam and
contend for that?" Quoted in Kammen, supra, note 17 at 119.
30

As Robert Dahl observed, "the Court is highly unusual, not least because Americans are
not quite willing to accept the fact that it is a political institution, and not quite capable of
denying it; so that we frequently take both positions at once." "Decision-Making in a
Democracy- The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker" (1957) 6 J.P.L. 280-81. For this
reason, attempts at executive and legislative interference with Supreme Court review are
considered heretical; most are abandoned, and some have been notoriously unsuccessful. For
example, when President Roosevelt introduced his court-packing plan in February of 1937,
"[o]vemight Supreme Court Justices were once more pictured as demigods far above the sweaty
crowd, abstractlyweighing public policy in the delicate scales of law." A.T. Mason, 77e Supreme
Court From Taft to Burger, 3d ed. (U.S.A.: Louisiana State University Press, 1978) at 102. Later
that year, the proposal was defeated.
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apart from any virtues of its own '3 13 2and remains "a sort of
abacadabra which [will] cure all disease."
Nor is the academy immune to the cult of the Constitution.
Edwin Corwin once described the Constitution as "an expression of
Higher Law, of imperfect man's most perfect renderings.... '33 More
recently, Henry Monaghan chided a number of leading scholars for
presuming the Constitution's perfection.3 4 The scholarship based on
that assumption largely forecloses critical discussion of the ideology
of liberal constitutionalism, and quibbles instead about the details of
interpretation.3 5 Naturally, taking your ethics for granted makes the
6
rest a mere problem of technique.
37
Although the u.s. Constitution has inspired critical comment
its ideals have been inspirational around the world. John Locke

31Kammen, supra, note 17 at 126-27 (quoting A. Lawrence Lowell).
32

1bid. at 38 (quoting Thurmon Arnold).

33

The "HigherLaw"BackgroundofAinerican ConstittttionalLaw (U.K.: Cornell University
Press, 1955) at vi.
34

"For [them], the Constitution is essentially perfect [because] properly construed, [it]
guarantees [most] values [they believe] ...
a twentieth century Western liberal democratic
government ought to guarantee...." "Our Perfect Constitution" (1982) 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353 at
358.
35
Curiously, commentators who identify majoritarian democracy as the Constitution's core
value do not reject judicial review, but instead offer theories purporting to vindicate that value
within a framework for review which remains indisputably countermajoritarian. John Hart Ely
provides the classic statement of this theory in Democracy and Dismist (U.S.A.: Harvard
University Press, 1980). Nor have those who attack the institution of review, ultimately
concluding it is indefensible, offered any concrete alternative. Along these lines, the most
compelling commentary is by Mark Tushnet in "Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique
of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles" (1983) 96 Harv. L. Rev. 781 and '"he Dilemmas of
Liberal Constitutionalism" (1981) 42 Ohio L. J. 411. Tushnet's answer is that he would "make
an explicitly political judgment," one which is "likely to advance the cause of socialism." Ibid.
at 424.
36

Hartz, supra, note 20 at 10.

37

See, for example, Letter, H. Laski to O.W. Holmes, in M. Howe, ed., Hohnes-Laski
Letters, Vol. 1, (New York: Atheneum, 1963) at 475 (describing the U.S. Constitution as the
"worst instrument of government that the mind of man has so far conceived").
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once said "Dl in the beginning all the world was America."38 Despite
insisting that "[n]othing is more annoying ...than the irritable
patriotism of the Americans," Alexis de Tocqueville's treatise
betrayed his fascination with "democracy in America."39 Even
William Gladstone allowed that the American Constitution was "the
most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain
and purpose of man."40 In the era following World War II, the
magnetic appeal of a written constitution enshrining individual rights
proved irresistible as scores of nations succumbed to the hegemonic
power of American constitutionalism. Canadians have discovered
how difficult it is to question an ideology that promises to respect
those individual "rights" insensitive democratic majorities so often
disregard.
Unfortunately, any review of American constitutional history
exposes a series of unheroic episodes which are neither isolated nor
insignificant in their contradiction of the epic account.
Notwithstanding their glorification, the Constitution has failed to
protect its cornerstone values. Time and again, liberty and equality
have been conveniently forgotten and viciously compromised to
political expedience.
Although man was created equal, the Constitution protected
the slave system 1 It required a civil war and the imposition of
amendments before the Constitution would address the most

38
Hartz, supra, note 20 at 61. Locke was not complimenting the Constitution, but instead
remarking that, in being free of a history of feudal strife, America effectively replicated the
state of nature.
39
j.P. Mayer, ed., Democracy in America (U.S.A.: Anchor Books, 1969) at 237. Thus
Tocqueville remarked that in America "civilized man was destined to build society on new
[and] present the world with a spectacle for which past history had not prepared
foundations ...
it." Ibid. at 30.
40

Quoted in Kammen, supra, note 17 at 162. At the same time, Gladstone described the
British Constitution as "the most subtile organism which had proceeded from the womb and
the long gestation of progressive history." For a brief comparison, see, infra, III. LIBERTY,
AUTHORITY, AND THE STATE.
41
Despite self-consciously avoiding mention of the word, the Constitution recognized the
institution of slavery in three clauses: the three-fifths clause dealing with direct taxes and
representation, the slave trade clause, and the fugitive slave clause. Moreover, despite the
Declaration of Independence's assertion of egalitarian values, the first ten amendments
comprising the bill of rights did not guarantee equality.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VCOL. 25 No. 2

egregious mistreatment of blacks. 42 Even so, the Civil War
amendments proved ineffective to stem a rising tide of backlash
which, by the early twentieth century, had effectively segregated and
disfranchised blacks. 43 Once the Supreme Court institutionalized it
in 1896, 44 segregation would remain constitutional orthodoxy until
1954. 45 Today the struggle to overcome the savage history of racial
subjugation lives on.46 In addition, despite their commitment to
liberty values, Americans have been grossly intolerant of activities
considered unpatriotic or un-American. 4 7 These counter-examples
could be multiplied many times over.48

42Among other things, the Civil War amendments abolish involuntary servitude (the
thirteenth amendment), guarantee the equal protection of the laws (the fourteenth amendment),
and prohibit the denial of a vote on grounds of race (the fifteenth amendment).
43

C.V. Woodward's account, The Strange Career of Jin Crow, 3d ed. (Oxford:
University Press, 1974), is authoritative.

Oxford

44Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
45

The history of race relations in this period is, for the most part, horrifying. The Supreme
Court began dismantling the doctrine of "separate but equal" in Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), by invalidating segregation in the public school system. For an account
of segregation in carrier services, see C. Barnes, Journey From Jir Crow: The Desegregationof
Southern Transit (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).
46As Justice Marshall observed, "[it is no defense] ... that the Constitution was a product
of its times, and embodied a compromise that, under other circumstances, would not have been
made [because] the effects [of that compromise] have remained for generations." Supra, note
28 at 18. Today, the public education system in the United States remains largely segregated,
and affirmative action inititiatives have just begun to challenge traditional conceptions of
equality.
47

During and following World War 1, scores of radicals, socialists, and pacifists were
prosecuted for a variety of "disloyal" words or actions. See generally, Z. Chafee, Free Speech
in the United States (U.S.A.: Harvard University Press, 1941). Then, throughout the 1950s, a
witch hunt against communists was conducted under the Smith Act and a variety of other
legislative measures. Once again, scores of Americans were convicted or dismissed from
employment for their belief in communism, or membership in communist organizations. As
Hartz concludes, "[a]t the bottom of the American experience of freedom, not in antagonism
to it but as a constituent element of it, there has always lain the inarticulate premise of
conformity...." Supra, note 20 at 57.
48

The Court's wartime internment of Japanese-Americans, infra note 176, and lochnerian
invalidation of legislation ameliorating unsafe or exploitive working conditions, infra notes 14648, supply two additional examples few American commentators will defend. Still others could
be added to the list.
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It can hardly be denied that American jurisprudence has been,
and is today, highly protective of individual liberty. After all, that
is the purpose of liberal constitutionalism. Because it seeks to
explain that ideology, this article makes no claim that the
Constitution denies liberty and equality more often than it protects
them, or that the United States protects those values less often than
nations without bills of rights. The point is that, to the extent
Americans assert the superiority of their system of constitutional
liberty, these counter-examples reveal how dramatic and inexplicable
its failures have been. The reality of historical experience is that
the Constitution's protection of individual liberty has been episodic.
Whenever romanticists claim an aggrandized status for American
constitutionalism, as they often do, it should be recalled that the
reality at least diminishes that claim, if not defeats it.
Apologists insist, however, that human imperfection, and not
the Constitution, is responsible for the gap between what is real
and ideal. Thus subsequent generations blamed the Europeans and
framers for the existence of the slave system;49 likewise, post-war
generations blamed the racists and robber barons of yesteryear for
the segregation and laissez-faire doctrines of the early twentieth
century; and this generation blames evil or incapable individuals,
rather than the presidency itself, for the shortcomings of separation
of powers theory. Surely any argument that the Constitution is not
responsible for human imperfection must be in vain, because that
will be true of every Constitution. Experience tells that precisely
because of human imperfection, the choice of institutional
arrangements is significant. It is especially worth noting that the
institution of judicial review has been a poor proxy for "man's most
perfect renderings." Seen always in the eye of the beholder, review
can aggravate human imperfection as easily as ameliorate it. At the
least, a system of constitutional rights enforced by the judiciary is
not a sufficient condition for the protection of liberty.

49

1n Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), Chief Justice Taney attempted to shift
responsibility for the perpetuation of the slave system back to the framers by concluding that
the Court was powerless to depart from their intention to exclude blacks from the Constitution.
Charles Evans Hughes once described Dred Scott as one of the Supreme Court's three most
serious "self-inflicted [institutional] wounds." The Supreme Court of the United States (N.Y.:
Columbia University Press, 1928) at 50.
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Despite the troubling gap between the romantic conception of
constitutional liberty and the reality of historical experience, the
dominant American ideology remains unshaken in its belief that the
preservation of liberty depends on a system of constitutional rights
and judicial review s
If the foregoing account has any merit,
Canadians should find that belief puzzling, if not patently irrational.
Thus it becomes critical to understand the assumptions that support
this faith. Identifying those assumptions and their roots can tell
Canadians whether, in adopting the Charter, we have misunderstood
the ideological underpinnings of American constitutionalism, and, in
interpreting its guarantees, how similar or different our own values
are.
III. LIBERTY, AUTHORITY, AND THE STATE

Abstract liberty, like other abstractions, is not to be found. Liberty inheres in some
sensible object; and every nation has formed to itself sonic .vourite point, which by
way of eminence becomes the criterion of their happiness."'

Americans believe that their version of constitutional liberty
represents self-evident truth.5 2 Though this rankles the British, by
countering that "the nations who dare to call themselves free have
built largely on British experience," Sir Ivor Jennings only confirmed
that, as an abstract concept, liberty is meaningless.53 Inherent in
any conception of liberty is a definition of the state. Distinct
conceptions of constitutional liberty reflect distinct conceptions of
the state and its authority.
Although Britain and the United States each claim fidelity to
the ideal of constitutional liberty, their systems of government rest
on distinct conceptual foundations. In the United States, the bill of
rights and Civil War amendments prohibit the state from abridging
50

51

Infra, note 151.
Kammen, supra, note 13 at 4 (quoting Edmund Burke).

52
According to Hartz, America's absolutism derives from "the somber faith that its norms
are self-evident." Supra, note 20 at 58.
53

The Law and the Constitution,5th ed. (U.K.: University of London Press, 1959) at 9.
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certain individual rights, and the judiciary invalidates government
actions inconsistent with those guarantees. In broad terms, liberty
comprehends the right of individuals to be free from state authority;
constitutional experience has institutionalized that conception of

the state; and, in claiming the prerogative of review, the judiciary
mediates conflicts between individual freedom and state authority,
deciding which will prevail in any case. 4
By contrast, becauses parliamentary supremacy is the governing
principle of British constitutionalism, it is conceptually impossible for
an individual to challenge the state's interference with individual
liberty. This principle decrees that Parliament may make or unmake
any law whatsoever, without submitting its actions to review by the
courts.5 5 Because Parliament's power is unlimited,56 democratic
process determines how the conflicting imperatives of individual
liberty and state authority will be reconciled. As Jennings explained,
constitutional liberty consists in "the existence of a free system of
government [which] creates an atmosphere of freedom."57 Though
this atmosphere "is more easily felt than analyzed,"58 the British

54These are the key elements of the American ideology of liberal constitutionalism. It
should be noted that this ideology does not give individual liberty absolute protection: not only
has the balance between liberty and authority shifted with events, the original conception
presupposes a compromise which accepts the legitimacy of the state's power to exercise
authority over individuals. Though the demands of individual liberty do not always prevail, this
conception is distinctive because it gives individuals a constitutional claim against the state, and
recognizes the authority of the judiciary to determine how the requirements of liberty and
authority will be reconciled.
55
A.V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, 9th ed. (G.B.: MacMillan & Co., 1939) at 3940. Thus, "[a]n Act of Parliament can do no wrong, though it may do several things that look
pretty odd." City of London v. Wood (1711), 12 Mod. 687.
56

Though legal restraints on Parliament's authority do not exist, by interpreting laws that
abridge liberty restrictively against the state, the judiciary has given individual rights limited
protection. When interpretive techniques cannot produce a sympathetic result, however, the
courts are bound to apply the law. O.H. Phillips and P. Jackson, 0. HoodPhillips Constitutional
andAdministrativeLaw, 6th ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1978) at 40.
57

Supra, note 53 at 61.

58

id.
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believe that it does not depend for its security on a written bill of
59
rights.
In general terms, constitutional liberty in the United States is
defined by the absence of state authority, whereas in Britain, by
resting on the unfettered authority of Parliament, it is the
opposite.60 Given the seeming incompatibility of these ideologies,
any suggestion that the American revolutionaries sought to emulate
the British constitution may appear ludicrous. Curiously, though,
despite seeking freedom from Britain, the colonists revolted "not
against the English Constitution, but on behalf of it,"61 and initially,
the British ideal offered the model of what a constitution should
be.62 Explanation of this divergence in ideology can be found in
subsequent events. The conception of the state which emerged in
America would be defined by the circumstances surrounding
revolution and the formation of the Constitution. By contrast, the
precepts of modern British constitutionalism would not crystallize
until the nineteenth century, with the emergence of the cabinet
system and responsible government.
To summarize, the British and American ideologies of liberty
are informed by distinct attitudes toward state authority. Although
some consider that notions of "positive" and "negative" liberty
explain those differences, such a distinction is at least incomplete, if
not largely unhelpful. First, the dichotomy itself reflects an attitude
toward authority. Negative liberty suggests an absence of authority

59

The principle of parliamentary supremacy has been modified in recent years by a variety
of human rights obligations Britain has assumed through its membership in international
communities. For a brief description see Phillips and Jackson, supra, note 56 at 41.
6In the past, Canada's constitutional tradition has straddled these two ideologies.
Although Canada adopted a parliamentary democracy modelled on Britain's system, the division
of powers set out in the CanadaAc4 1867 has been enforced through judicial review. Except
in the case of language and denominational school rights, however, the CanadaAct, 1S67 does
not protect individual liberty, as in the British system, conflicts between state authority and
individual rights were traditionally resolved through the democratic process. See P. Hogg,
ConstitutionalLaw of Canada,2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell Co., 1985) at 257-58. By importing
the American ideology of individual rights review, the Charter has displaced the traditional
principle of parliamentary supremacy.
61

G. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic (U.S.A.:
Press, 1969) at 10.
62

Ibid. at 44.
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and positive liberty, its presence. Second, the distinction can be
deceptive. In substantive terms, both nations - and Canada as well
- are committed to a combination of negative and positive liberty
values. Just as the principle of parliamentary supremacy does not
mean that Britain's democracy eschews individual freedom,
America's liberal constitutionalism does not deny the state a positive
role in that nation's pursuit of the "Blessings of Liberty."'63 By
locating the power to resolve conflicts between liberty and authority
in different institutions, however, the British and American
ideologies reveal distinct concepts of the state. In this sense,
constitutional liberty has substantive and institutional dimensions.
As a matter of substance, Britain and the United States will agree
in many cases on what liberty requires; nonetheless, the authority to
decide that issue resides in different institutions in the two
countries. The idea of constitutional liberty not only defines the
substantive requirements of liberty, but also expresses a concept of
institutional role. And it is that concept of institutional role that
largely distinguishes a system of 64constitutional rights from a
traditional parliamentary democracy.
The American conception of constitutional liberty rests on a
profound distrust of authority. At least since the Revolution, this
distrust has been one of the enduring dogmas of American
constitutional culture. Originating in eighteenth-century ideology
and events, this distrust is rooted in the revolutionary experience, is
manifest in the Constitution itself, and has been a pervasive theme
in American constitutionalism since. In 1923, at the height of
laissez-faire constitutionalism, Harold Laski would lament, "I wish to
heaven that Americans would realize that a constitution built on the
historic dogmas of the xvith century has very little application to

63

Preamble, United States Constitution.

64This article focuses on the institutionalization of the Americans' distrust of authority.
As described below, it identifies "distrust" as a fundamental theme in American constitutional
culture. In doing so, it makes no suggestion that this theme precludes other equally important
cultural themes. It only claims that the extent to which this distrust is entrenched in U.S.
constitutional culture is inadequately addressed by Americans, and as a result, is not understood
at all by Canadians. Individualism and its embodiment in traditional concepts of liberty and

equality suggests a second major theme which is worthy of examination by Canadians.
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our own time."65 Although constitutional rights and judicial review
are often portrayed as the perfect antidote to the actions of
irresponsible democratic majorities, in interpreting the Charter it is

critical to recognize that the ideological underpinnings of American
constitutionalism are not as admirable as the epic suggests.
Although Americans neither deny nor ignore this distrust, it
lacks sufficient appeal to play a leading role in the romantic
account. The problem is that because the cult of the Constitution
dominates, it is not always understood that liberal constitutionalism
rests on an attitude toward the state which is predominantly hostile.
In reality, American conceptions of liberty, constitutional rights, and
judicial review cannot be understood without reference to the
distrust of authority that animates these concepts. Unfortunately, as
a result of misperception, the concomitant institutional consequences
of permitting an unaccountable judiciary to frustrate the state's
democratic processes are also diminished.
By focussing on the revolutionary and Constitution-making eras,
Part IV explores the roots of this distrust before discussing its
relationship to the institution of judicial review.
IV. LIBERTY AND DISTRUST OF AUTHORITY
A. Introduction
[The Constitution is an historically discontinuous composition; it is the product, over
time, of a series of not altogether coherent compromises; it mirrors no single vision

or philosophy but reflects insggad a set of sometimes reinforcing and sometimes
conflicting ideals and notions.'8

More daunting than the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence,
the American constitutional scholarship debates more than two
hundred years of political experience in a literature that is complex
and sophisticated.
Highly interdisciplinary, this monumental
scholarship explores the ideological origins of the revolutionary

65

Letter to Oliver Wendell Holmes, August 10, 1923, Ilolnies-Laski Letters, Vol. 1, supra,

note 37 at 376.
66

L. Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw, 2d ed. (New York: Foundation Press Inc., 1988)

at 1 (footnote omitted).
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movement, examines the theory of the Constitution, analyzes shifts
in ideology over the last two hundred years, and attacks or
rationalizes the legitimacy of judicial review. The above comprise a
few, only, among legions of topics addressed by this diverse
scholarship.
Recently, scholars have taken up the challenge to articulate a
This
"true" characterization of American political ideology.
literature debates whether liberalism or republicanism dominates
U.S. constitutional culture. Fortunately, this article does not
undertake to resolve complex issues of historical interpretation. As
Ralph Lerner so aptly stated: "The corpus of early American
political writings [takes] on the character of a psychopathologist's
cabinet of curiosa." 67 It is unnecessary here to take sides on this
issue because both conceptions of the state accept the existence of
a cultural distrust of authority. Though Americans may not admit
that this distrust diminishes the epic account, they are cognizant that
it plays a significant role in their ideological heritage. Without
denying its presence, then, commentators analyze its role in shaping
America's political ideology and in particular, question whether this
distrust points inexorably toward a liberal conception or otherwise
can be reconciled with republican values.68
Less ambitiously, this article isolates a conception of authority
which is not controversial, and then analyzes the connection
between that conception and the institution of judicial review. It
traces this distrust, in the first instance, through sections reviewing
the American Revolution and the formation of the Constitution.
The discussion relies heavily, though not exclusively, on mainstream
works by Bernard Bailyn, 69 Gordon Wood, 70 Louis Hartz,71 J.G.A.
67

"' ne Constitution of the Thinking Revolutionary" in R. Beeman, S.Botein, and E. Carter
I, eds, Beyond Confederation:Originsof the Constitution andAniericanNationalIdentity (U.S.A.:
University of North Carolina Press, 1987) 38 at 40.
6For further discussion see infra, D. Liberal and Republican Conceptions of the State.
69Supra, note 20. Bailyn's seminal book traces the ideological origins of the revolutionary
movement, rooting American republicanism in English opposition thought.
70Supra, note 61. Also rendering a republican interpretation, Wood's book analyzes the
evolution of constitutional theory in the years between Independence and the creation of the

Constitution.
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Pocock 72 and more recently, John Diggins. 73 Though the debate
about liberal versus republican conceptions of the state will remain
unresolved, that issue is less relevant to Canadians. It is more
instructive for us to understand that the institution of review is
based on a distrust of authority which has its roots in the ideology
and events of eighteenth-century America.
The ensuing section on judicial review faces a different
problem, which is that of tracing the evolution of liberal
constitutionalism over the last two hundred years. Taking comfort
from Professor Tribe's observation,74 this part of the paper does not
propose that a single vision or philosophy has animated the
Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence. At the same time it
does claim that a distrust of authority has been a prevalent theme
in constitutional interpretation.
Without suggesting that the
jurisprudence has always struck an unhappy balance between the
requirements of liberty and authority, this article introduces the
conceptual foundations of review in order to expose its irresolvable
dilemma. That dilemma is easily stated: precisely because of the
Americans' distrust of authority, judicial review is itself an institution
perpetually in search of its own authority. 75

71

Supra, note 20. Hartz explores the distinctive nature of American liberalism, focussing

particular attention on the relevance of socio-economic circumstances - in particular, the
absence of Old World feudalism - to the development of ideology.
72

The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1975). Pocock's

provocative book gives American republicanism a Machiavellian interpretation.
73

The Lost Soul ofAmerican Politics: Frtue,Self-Interest and the Foundationsof Liberalisn
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). Diggins critiques the republican account and
reinterprets liberalism from a theological perspective.

74Supra, note 66.
75

See infra, E. Judicial review: the "leastdangerous branch"
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B. The American Revolution: Self-Evident Truth76
Faith ran high that a better world than any that had ever been known could be built
where authority was distrusted and held in constant scrutiny;, ... where the use of
power over the lives of men was jealously guarded and severely restricted. It was
only where there was this defiance, this refusal to truckle, this distrust of all
authority, pq9 tical or social, that institutions would express human aspirations, not
crush them.

The ideology of the revolutionary movement has shaped all of
American constitutionalism. 78 The Declaration of Independence
proclaimed this ideology, the Constitution institutionalized it, and it
remains vibrant today, two hundred years later. 79 While exalting

individualist values, this ideology also embraces an exaggerated
distrust of authority. In the revolutionary era, a distrust of authority
developed from the perception that corrupt forces in Britain had

76The Declaration of Independence begins with the following.
We hold these tmuths to be self-eviden, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creatorwith certainunalienablerights,that among these are life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness.

77Bailyn, supra, note 20 at 319.
78Few dispute this proposition. For direct support, see Bailyn, ibid., note 20 at 21 and
Wood, supra, note 61 at ix.
79

In his critique of the republican account, John Diggins challenges historical
interpretations which assert a causal relationship between words and actions. Because it is
impossible to establish such a relationship, "ideology" has only an expressive function for him,
.not necessarily an originative one." Thus Diggins describes the revolutionary discourse as
rhetoric rather than ideology. Supra, note 73 at 350. The conflation of ideology and rhetoric
is apparent in Ralph Lerner's observation that "[w]hat [the revolutionaries] took to be high
principle, even self-evident truth, was in fact ideology, a dramaticway of makingsense of a world
somehow gone awry." Supra, note 67 at 39 [emphasis added]. In using the word ideology, I claim
only that words suggest perceptions, and do not enter the debate whether ideas, rather than
pragmatic interests, actually motivate men and cause events to occur.
Moreover, aware of the difficulties inherent in any attempt to establish historical truth, I
undertake only to make a series of empirical observations and to draw conclusions from those
observations. In this and the following sections, I note that a revolutionary discourse of distrust
was followed by a Constitution institutionalizing a distrust of authority, which, in turn, was
followed by the evolution of judicial review, an institution based on a distrust of the authority
of the other branches. Tellingly, the perennial controversy about review is rooted in a distrust
of judicial authority.
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conspired to oppress the thirteen colonies.80 Because the colonists'
complaint of oppression was tenuous, the rebellion was based on an
interpretation of events which was somewhat distorted, and
consequently, on an ideological reaction against authority. 81
In contriving this conspiracy, the colonists were inspired by
Britain's opposition thinkers. Though this disparate group was
effectively ignored in Britain, the colonists absorbed their writings
eagerly and relied heavily on them in justifying their rebellion.8 2 Albeit deviant in its jealous regard for individualist values and extreme
distrust of authority, the opposition commentary was credible
because it was rooted in contemporary political thought.83 The
84
opposition's distrust of authority manifested a deep pessimism
which was expressed in a "peculiar strain of anti-authoritarianism

80Although the antecedents of this revolutionary distrust may be found in earlier colonial
history, this article does not explore that possibility. Hence it makes no claim that this distrust
was generated, uniquely and spontaneously, during the period of the revolutionary movement;
it claims only that a rhetoric of distrust crystallized at that time, and subsequently influenced
the conception of the state embodied in the Constitution.
81

See, for example, Wood, supra, note 61 at 3 (stating that the American Revolution was
"the most wanton and unnatural rebellion that ever existed") and Hartz, supra, note 20 at 5
(concluding that because America never experienced a struggle against feudal institutions, it
lacked a genuine revolutionary tradition).
S2As Bailyn puts it, the tradition of opposition thought was not simply sampled, it was
literally "devoured" by the colonists at the end of the 17th century and in the early 18th century.
Supra, note 20 at 34-54. Wood states that "more than any other source, this disaffected whig
thought fused and focused the elements that shaped the colonists' conception of the English
Constitution and English politics." Supra, note 61 at 17. In Britain, the radical whig
commentary attracted little attention and received even less respect. Ibid. at 15-16. In the
colonial environment, however, ideas considered "extreme" and "dislocating" in Britain sounded
like "simple statements of fact." Bailyn, ibid. at 51.
83Democratic institutions had not yet emerged, and contemporary thought viewed politics
as "nothing more than a perpetual battle between the passions of the rulers ...and the united
interest of the people." Wood, supra note 61 at 18. The result was a "perpetual intestine
struggle, open or secret, between AUTHORITY and LIBERTY." Kammen, supra, note 13 at
21 (quoting David Hume).
84This pessimism viewed authority as necessarily antagonistic to liberty because it implied
the dominion of some individuals over others. Because power meant domination, it would
always threaten individual liberty. In addition, because human nature was governed by a desire
to dominate, power and authority were also necessarily aggressive. Thus sources of authority
would seek to increase their power at the expense of individual liberty. Given this quest for
power, man was inescapably corruptible, and liberty could only be preserved by constraining
authority. See Bailyn, supra, note 20 at 55-93.

1987)

Ameican Constitutionalism

bred in the upheaval of the English Civil War."85 When applied to
contemporary events, these ideas produced a fearful and despairing
commentary predicting the imminent demise of constitutional liberty
86
in Britain.
This prognosis coincided with, and reinforced, the colonists'
perception of reality between 1763 and 1776. In this period, the
English opposition charged that the abuse of executive authority had
brought the British Constitution to the brink of a cataclysmic
crisis.8 7 Its alarmist rhetoric fuelled fears generated by imperial
policy in the thirteen colonies after 1763.
The details of British rule in this period, commencing with the
Stamp Acts and culminating in the Declaration of Independence,
are well known.8s As a result of revenue acts, the colonists' fears
about standing armies, interference with the independence of the
judiciary, and a variety of other irritants, the Americans began to
believe that corrupt forces had subverted the Constitution and
mounted "a deliberate assault ...
against liberty," both in England

and America.89 Although the colonists could excuse an isolated
intrusion on their liberty, the pattern of imperial policy in these
years pointed to "a deliberate, systemmatical plan of reducing
[America] to slavery."90 Thus the colonial perception of events made
the opposition prognosis convincing, and Americans concluded that

85
Ibid. at viii. As Wood puts it, "[t]he revolutionary character of these radical Whigs came
more fundamentally from their fierce and total unwillingness to accept the developments of the
eighteenth century." Supra, note 61 at 15.
86

7bid. at 15-17.

87Though Parliament had established its supremacy, responsible government had not yet
emerged. As a result, the King's ministers often secured Parliament's support for the monarch
through bribery and influence. Thus the opposition contended that, through this process of
executive influence, the Constitution had been subverted by a "gluttonous ministry usurping the
prerogatives of the crown and systematically corrupting the independence of the commons."
Bailyn, supra, note 20 at 130. Responsible government would crystallize in the nineteenth
century with the evolution of the cabinet system and the Reform Act of 1832.
88For a description of these events, see ibid. at 94-143.
8

90

Ibid. at 95.
Wood, supra, note 61 at 39 (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
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their "dear-bought liberty [stood] upon the brink of destruction." 91
This perception of tyrannical oppression caused by a Constitution
gone wrong instilled a distrust of the British and generated a
rejection of external authority. Independence became salvation and
a defiance of authority literally "poured from the colonial presses
and was hurled from half the pulpits of the land"; it leaped "like a
spark from one flammable area to another, growing in heat as it
went."92 The American Revolution was not fought because the
colonists had never tasted liberty: it was fought to rescue liberty
from authority. The intense emotions of this period bred a distrust,
not just of colonial authority, but of all authority.93
Nonetheless, because the colonists' distrust of authority was
associated with imperial rule, Americans were initially confident that
Independence would usher in a millenial era. 94 But even the
millenium required a conception of the state, and the colonists,
"having resorted to power to throw off whatever power did not
come from themselves, had [next] to confront the problem of their
own power."95 The years between Independence and the
Philadelphia Convention of 1787 demonstrate that "the politics of
fear, suspicion, jealousy and hatred" gave Americans "only the
language with which to denounce power, not the ideas and emotions
to deal with authority."96 The negative ideology of the rebellion
remained powerful, and in 1787 the Americans created a
Constitution that institutionalized the revolutionary distrust of
authority.
91

Bailyn, supra, note 20 at 91. They believed that the "whole fabric [of British
constitutionalism] was ready to come down in ruins...." Wood, supra, note 61 at 36 (quoting
James Burgh).
92

Bailyn, ibid. at 304-05.

93

Thus the true revolutionary creed: "[R]esist not only all authority over us as it now exists,
but any and all that it is possible to constitute." Ibid. at 318.
94

The revolutionary movement was "sustained by a powerful, even millenial creed by which
Americans saw themselves ... on the verge of ushering in a new era of freedom and bliss."
Wood, supra, note 61 at 44.
95

Diggins, supra, note 73 at 96.

961bid. at 63-64 (paraphrasing Abraham Lincoln).
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97
C. The U.S. Constitution: A More Perfect Union

Theory is the most important part of the dogma of the law, as-the architect is the
most important man who takes part in the building of a house?T

Instead of the millenium, Independence brought chaos and
disillusion. Union under national institutions was unrealistic at the
outset because the creation of a central authority would revive the
distrust that had propelled the revolutionary movement. Instead,
the thirteen states established their own Constitutions, and otherwise
associated, for limited purposes, under the Articles of
Confederation. Even this agreement, which neither created national
institutions nor restricted the powers of the states, was
contentious.9 9 In a climate of economic confusion, social flux, and
general dislocation, the Articles of Confederation quickly became
1
dysfunctional, pitching the "designs of providence" into crisis. 0
The gravamen of the complaint against Britain was that the
colonists' liberty had been undermined by the corruption of
executive authority. Because external imperial authority was the
source of this tyranny, Americans assumed that to achieve liberty, it
was only necessary to deny that authority and repose sovereignty in
97The Preamble states that "We, the People ... in Order to form a more perfect Union ...
establish this Constitution."
98

0.W. Holmes, CollectedLegal Papers (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920) at

200.
99Though the agreement was proposed in 1777, the Articles of Confederation were not
ratified until 1781.
100Because the Confederation lacked executive and judicial institutions, and had no
authority to impose taxes, regulate trade, or issue currency, the form of union created by the
Articles was insuperably weak. Moreover, in the absence of restraints, the states engaged in
protectionist economic activity, and became embroiled in disputes over frontier boundaries.
Internal state politics were also unstable, as measures confiscating property, issuing paper
money, and interfering with the recovery of debt caused a widespread perception that state
legislation was unjust, unfair, capricious, and arbitrary. See Wood, supra, note 61 at 393-429 and
R. Bernstein (with K. Rice), Are We To Be A Nation? The Making of the Constitution (U.S.A.:
Harvard University Press, 1987) at 81-111.
By the 1780s, "[tihe situation of the general government, if it [could] be called a government,
[was] shaken to its foundation, and liable to be overturned by every blast." Letter, George
Washington to Thomas Jefferson, quoted in J. King, "lrois Sortes de Pouvoir: In Changing

Times" (1987) 7 Pace L. Rev. 563 at 565.
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"the people." Events revealed, however, that the revolutionary
objective of liberty was not secure under a decentralized scheme of
self-government. In exercising newly acquired sovereign power, the
people acted in callous disregard of the freedom of individuals, and
Americans quickly learned that legislative majorities could also be
self-seeking, corrupt, and oppressive. This problem, which appeared
to be the reverse of that suffered under imperial rule, caused the
"inveterate suspicion and jealousy of political power" which had
animated the Revolution
to be transferred from the British crown to
101
the state legislatures.
Thus Independence proved how resilient the Revolution's
'jealousy of power" was. Instead of preventing tyranny, the ideal of
popular sovereignty reinforced the view that no constituted authority
could be trusted.102 In short years, Americans moved from
challenging British tyranny in the name of liberty and virtue to
challenging all power and authority in the name of freedom and
equality. 103 As Henry Adams would subsequently state, "[t]he great
object of terror and suspicion to the people of the thirteen
provinces was power, not merely in the hands of a president or a
prince, of one assembly or several, or many citizens or of few, but
of power in the abstract."1°4
Those who refused to relinquish the ideals of the Revolution
became convinced that sweeping reform was necessary. Though the
rhetoric of distrust remained fresh, federalist politicians recognized
that, by creating no effective authority,. the Articles of
Confederation did not achieve a workable balance between liberty
and authority. Hence the paradox: having rebelled against central
authority in the name of liberty, Americans recognized that if liberty
were to survive, reforms centralizing authority were needed.
101Wood, ibid. at 409. As Judge Alexander Hanson observed in 1784, "[t]he acts of almost
every legislature have uniformly tended to disgust its citizens, and to annihilate its credit." Ibid.
at 406. In 1787, a group of Pennsylvania citizens resolved to settle all cases between themselves
by arbitration, "to prevent the people from wasting their property by the chicane of the law."

Ibid. at 407.
102See ibid. at 363-72.
103

Diggins, supra, note 73 at 75.

104Quoted in Diggins, ibid. at 57.
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This was a task of some delicacy. Although self-government
exposed a conflict between the ideals of popular sovereignty and
individual liberty, seeking a solution in a federal republic remained
problematic. Madison, for one, believed that the solution lay in a
system of government that would remain responsible to the people
by permitting no authority, not even that of the people's
representatives, to acquire or exercise tyrannical powers.1 05 The
acceptability of any proposal for centralized institutions would
depend on the framers' ability to allay the fear of authority that
remained pervasive.
The institutional features of the proposed Constitution
responded directly to this endemic distrust, with a separation of
powers supplying the palliative.1 0 6 Replying first to charges that the
proposed republic would be remote, alien, and distant from the
people, the framers argued that the Constitution was consistent with
popular sovereignty, and also that its pluralist design would avoid
the problem of faction.!0 7 In addition, they claimed that it would be
impossible for the central authority to tyrannize the people, because
the Constitution's structures were carefully designed to limit and
diffuse the state's authority. The federal government's powers were
limited, in the first instance, by those retained by the state
governments and the people.108 Then, to diffuse the powers

105"If the people were as corrupt and vicious ... as the 80s seemed to indicate," only "the
institution [of government] managed a certain way could manage an unvirtuous people." Quoted
in Wood, supra, note 61 at 429.
106
This Article emphasizes the conception of the state which is reflected in the institutional
features of the Constitution, and therefore does not address its broader sociological agenda,
which is debated in a rich literature discussing the socio-economic circumstances surrounding
the creation of the Constitution. The classic treatment is by Charles Beard, An Economic
Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co.,
1941).

107See the discussion of the problem of faction in C. Rossiter, ed., The FederalistPapers,
#10 (U.S.A.: Mentor Books, 1961) at 77-84. The Federalist Papers is a collection of essays
advocating ratification of the Constitution, in which James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and
John Jay discuss the theory of the Constitution and respond to the arguments of those opposing
its adoption. For further discussion, see Wood, supra, note 61 at 503-06.
108
According to the original conception, the federal branches would possess those powers,
and only those powers, expressly delegated to them by the terms of the Constitution itself. The
sovereign power would rest otherwise, either with the states, or with the people themselves. See
Amendments IX and X.
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delegated to the federal institutions, the Constitution set up a
complex separation of powers, establishing discrete sources of
authority in the legislative, executive, and judical branches, together
with a system of checks and balances to prevent the undue
accumulation of power in any single branch.1" 9 In theory, liberty
would be preserved by a system in which institutional safeguards
precluded any branch from appropriating power or encroaching on
the jurisdiction of the other branches.
During the ratification debates, the Federalists relied primarily
on the separation of powers to meet the fear of authority
motivating the opposition. Proponents of the Constitution argued
that a separation of powers was "the basis of all free governments,"
and provided the mechanism by which "the powers of government
[would be] so divided and balanced among several bodies of
magistracy, as that no one should transcend their legal limits,
without being effectively checked and restrained by the other
branches. 110 The faith Americans placed in separation of powers
theory reveals how deep-seated their distrust of authority was, and
demonstrates the degree to which they believed the preservation of
liberty depended on the institutionalization of this distrust. 111
The Constitution addresses the Americans' distinctive fear of
authority in other ways as well. Though the epic of constitutional
liberty traces the concept of a written constitution to social contract
theory,112 this concept also owes its existence to a distrust of
1 09

Fora discussion of the separation of powers, see Federalist#47-51, supra, note 107 at

300-25.
110

Wood, supra, note 61 at 453 (quoting Thomas Jefferson).

11 1
What is striking about TheFederalistPapersis how many of the essays urging ratification
argue the case in negative terms by dwelling on man's imperfection and the threat of tyranny,
and then defending the institutional safeguards needed to prevent any abuse of authority.
According to Henry Adams, the governing principle of American constitutionalism was that
"absolute power in any form was inconsistent with freedom," and therefore, that "public liberties
depend upon denying uncontrolled authority in the political system in its parts or its whole."

Quoted in Diggins, supra, note 73 at 58.
112

By rejecting the idea that authority could be based on birthright, and reposing sovereign
authority in the people, the Americans adopted a Constitution based on social contract theory.
The contract portrays the individual as a natural and sovereign being, who is forced to delegate
some of that sovereignty to an artificial state, in order to avoid the conflicts which would ensue
in a perpetual state of nature. Because the state is created by the people, its authority is derived
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authority. No contract, not even a social contract, needs to be
written; once again, however, history instructed. Perceiving that
they had suffered the abuse of executive colonial authority, as well
as the excesses of unfettered majoritarianism, Americans considered
it unthinkable that the fate of their liberty be left to fortuity.
Unwritten and changeable rules of government were dangerous:
authority could only be controlled through "some certain terms of
agreement," and a written constitution provided the best security
against" the danger of an indefinite dependence on an undetermined
113
power."
Moreover, despite the weakness of the Articles of
Confederation, and the careful design of the federal republic, the
thirteen states exacted ten amendments as the price for the
Constitution's ratification. 14 In part because the states predated the
federal government, their resistance to a Constitution which would
undercut local autonomy was natural.
Additionally, the antiFederalists revived the rhetoric of distrust which had animated the
revolutionary movement, claiming on ideological grounds that the
Constitution threatened a return to tyranny, and compromised the
republican ideal.1 15 To secure its ratification, the framers promised
to amend the Constitution and include a bill of rights. Although
the separation of powers made the addition of textual guarantees
conceptually unnecessary, skeptics unwilling to trust the future of
liberty to the principle of implicit limitations on the central
government's authority insisted on the inclusion of a textual list of

from their consent to be governed, and its powers are strictly limited to those that promote
individual liberty. By focussing attention on the relationship between individuals and the state,
social contract theory is inherently romantic and inescapably individualistic. Despite this
romanticism, the social contract holds a negative view of the state in which liberty depends on
the absence of authority.
1 13

Vood, supra, note 61 at 267. It should also be noted that the concept of a written
constitution was already familiar to Americans through their experience with colonial charters
and state constitutions.
114Its opponents claimed that "[t]he tyranny of Philadelphia may be like the tyranny of
George III." Wood, ibid. at 521 (quoting Patrick Henry).
115

5ee infra, D. Liberal and Republican Conceptions of the State.
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freedoms the
federal government was strictly prohibited from
11 6
abridging.
Whether from a liberal or republican perspective, distrust
was unquestionably a foundational theme in American constitutional
ideology.1 1 7 Although neither the revolutionary movement nor the
debate surrounding the framing of the Constitution could predestine
the course of subsequent history, the ideology taking shape in those
formative years supports a distrustful conception of the state, which,
while it has evolved over time, still characterizes American
constitutionalism.
D. Liberal and Republican Conceptions of the State
Classical republicanism and American liberalism have usually been regarded as
antithetical. The one represents the archaic values of simplicity, frugality, self-

control, and duty to the polity, the other, the modern tenets of change, progress,
self-interest, natural rights, and freedom from political authority. 1

It remains to locate the theme of this Article, analyzing the
American conception of constitutional liberty in terms of a distrust
of authority, within the broader debate about liberalism and
republicanism. The republican renaissance has its genesis in classic
treatises by Bernard Bailyn,' 19 Gordon Wood 1 20 and J.G.A.

116

The fact that certain bill of rights provisions absolutely prohibit any state interference
with certain rights reveals, once again, how profoundly suspicious Americans were of the newly
created central authority. See, for example, the first amendment:
Congressshallmake no law respectingan establishmentofreligion, orproldbitingthefree

exercise thereof; or abridgingthe freedom of speecl or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble.... [emphasis added].
117As Diggins observes, "[t]he techniques of controlling power would be a legacy of both
the Federalists and anti-Federalists," and "[s]o too would be the fear of power, as the
Federalists and anti-Federalists grew suspicious of each other's moves." Supra, note 73 at 49.
11 8

1bid. at 19.

119Supra, note 20.
120Supra, note 61.
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Pocock 21
Broadly conceived, republicanism contemplates a
participatory democratic state based on a concept of collective civic
virtue. Citizens of the state are committed to a shared concept of
the polity, and their relationship to the state is defined by a
communitarian political ethic. As such, republicanism is not
antagonistic to authority and in a classical republic, it is the polis,
not individual liberty, which prevails 22
Liberalism advances a different conception of the state.
According to this view, man is atomistic and pre-social. He will
seek to advance his own interests and in doing so, to assert his
dominion over others. He agrees to surrender some of his natural
powers and rights of self-dominion to the state, in order to avoid
conflicts inherent in the state of nature which interfere with his
individual self-maximization as an individual. Based on social
contract and natural rights theory, this conception exalts
individualism and can only accept a minimalist state. It is
individualistic and inherently distrustful of authority.' z
Though from different perspectives, the proposed Constitution
threatened both conceptions of the state. According to the
American adaptation of liberal theory, the Constitution created a
central authority which, through the accretion of institutional power,
would naturally threaten individual freedom. Walter Whitman
summed up liberalism's distrust of authority in the following words:
124
"[r]esist much, obey little."'
Although liberalism and republicanism are frequently placed in
opposition, proponents of republican theory shared in this distrust.
Liberalism is hostile to the state because when the state exercises its
authority, it necessarily interferes with individual freedom. By
contrast, the perennial threat to republican virtue is not authority

121

122

Supra, note 71.
For an extended discussion, see Wood, supra, note 61 at 46-91.

123Supra, note 112.
124

Diggins, supra, note 73 at 14.
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itself, but the corruption of authority. 25 The proposed Constitution
threatened republican values, in the first instance, because it created
a central authority. National institutions would compromise the
ideal of republican virtue because participatory self-government
required a communitarian spirit, which could only be attained in
decentralized or geographically homogenous groups.12 6 Republican
theory also distrusted the Constitution because it created a source
of authority which, in being removed from the people, could
become corrupt and tyrannous. To a large extent, this was the
gravamen of the complaint against colonial rule by the British. 27
By proposing a powerful source of authority, separate from, and
therefore inescapably less responsive to, the people, the Constitution
not only threatened participatory self-government but also created
a potentially irresponsible power structure.
Proponents of both theories integrate the Americans' distinctive
distrust of authority into their respective conceptions of the state.
Whereas liberalism would deny the state the authority to interfere
with individual freedom, republicanism would seek to channel and
control that authority, in order to prevent its corruption. Whether
the liberal vision dominated the republican, or the converse, it is
beyond dispute, as a matter of empirical observation, that the
institutions of the Constitution themselves demonstrate an obsessive

125"In classical thought the omnipresent fear was "corruption" - the citizen's surrender to
base material appetites - a potentially irreversible tendency that could be arrested only if the
political theorist or great legislator reeducates the people to the ideals of public duty." Diggins,
ibid at 19. English opposition thought embraced this fear of corruption. Infra, note 127.
12 6 Because classical theorists assumed that these values could only flourish in a small
republic where citizens participate actively in the workings of government, the anti-Federalists
remained suspicious of a remote, central government. Diggins, supra, note 73 at 64. For a
summary of the republican opposition to the Constitution, see G. Stone, L. Seidman, C.
-Sunstein, and M. Tushnet, ConstitutionalLaw (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1986) at 5-6.
12 7

The American colonists drew on the critique of the English opposition, which endorsed
classical republican theory and explained contemporary events in terms of the corruption of

executive power. To the extent that critique also explained events occurring in the thirteen
colonies between 1763 and 1776, the American Revolution was fought because of a distrust of
authority constituted a particular way, and not because of a distrust of all authority. Hence, the

debate about whether republicanism's fears of power gone corrupt, or liberalism's fear of all
authority, shaped the American conception of the state in these years.
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concern with the management of power, and the
structures
128
tendencies.
expansive
and
evil
its
necessary to contain
For purposes of this article, it is not essential to decide
between these competing conceptions.1 29 As a matter of historical
interpretation it is problematic, in any case, to characterize the
Constitution as either liberal or republican: "[b]etween Machiavelli
and Locke lies the dilemma of American politics."1 30 Both
conceptions are elemental themes in u.s. constitutional ideology. At
inception, fears about the fate of individual freedom influenced the
framers in determining how the authority of the state could be
structured to achieve the objective of participatory democracy in a
federal republic. Moreover, both conceptions have been present
throughout American constitutional history,
though in "differing
1 31
measure and with shifting importance."
In large part because of a focus on the institution of review,
this paper favours the liberal account. Though the rhetoric of
republicanism is compelling, and has been a prominent theme in
American constitutionalism, the institutional history of the
Constitution suggests the dominance of liberal values. By idealizing
the concept of civic virtue and suggesting that the Constitution
represented a publicly-minded citizenry willing to forego individual
liberty in the interests of the polis, republicanism generates its own
brand of romanticism.
As Diggins persuasively argues, the "liberal legacy has troubled
generations of American intellectuals." 132 Republicanism posits an
128

Both the proponents and critics of the Constitution agreed that "the degeneration of a

government could be avoided," not by "moral principles or rhetorical persuasions but simply by

placing a series of obstructions in its path." Diggins, supra, note 73 at 59-60.
129

Because they reflect different methods of resolving the conflict between liberty and

authority, discussion of their respective merits as models for government has currency today for
theories of judicial review. However, this paper does not propose a theory of review, either for

the United States or for Canada.
13 0

Diggins, supra, note 73 at 16.

131

M. Sandel, "The Political Theory of the Procedural Republic" in A. Hutchinson and P.

Monahan, eds, The Rule of Law: Idea or Ideology (Toronto: Carswell Co., 1987) at 92.
132
Supra, note 73 at 5. "Individualism seemed to leave America without a sense of moral
community and pluralism without a sense of national purpose." Ibid.
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optimistic view of man and permits an idealistic interpretation of
Independence and the formation of the Constitution.13 3 Without
denying republican values a role, the theory of the Constitution, its
institutional arrangements, and the course of history all seem to
vindicate the liberal explanation. If republican and liberal rhetoric
both animated the movement culminating in Independence, the
Constitution itself responds more to liberal pessimism than to
participatory republican progressivism. The American republic did
embody a new science of politics, but one based on fear, not of "the
familiar subversion [in republican theory] of a virtuous assembly by
a corrupt executive," but of man, the "creature of desire who, unless
constrained by external checks, will act collectively to coerce,
tyrannize and oppress fellow man."134 Moreover, even if it can be
said that the original conception of the Constitution was republican
rather than liberal, it was a brand of republicanism which, when its
135
rhetoric was reduced, effectively replicated liberalism.
In the end, it is difficult to dispute that liberalism has
dominated America's political culture, especially in this century. If
it did not dominate in 1776, 1787, or before the Civil War, it has
dominated since, in large part because of the evolution of judicial
review 36 Once again, whether or not liberal values should prevail
is a separate question; the point here is to note that, without

13 3

Thus the Revolution was not fought to vindicate liberal laissez-faire individualism, but

was instead a herculean effort to preserve America's virtue from the corrupt and corrupting

forces of English politics. Ibid. at 9-10. Comprising "a truly original formulation of political
assumptions" and creating "a distinctly American system of politics," the Constitution was itself
visionary. Wood, supra, note 61 at ix.

134Diggins,supra, note 73 at 77.
135As Diggins argues, to the extent that the idea of virtue provided the conceptual
foundation for a scheme of government which sought to avoid treachery and tyranny, "classical
republican rhetoric could achieve little more than negative freedom, freedom from political
power and public authority, freedom for man to pursue his own ends, individual freedom - in
a word, liberalism." Ibid. at 31.
1360ne scholar attributes the debate between "rights-based liberalism" and communitarian
republicanism to the advent, in the twentieth century, of a "public life animated by the rightsbased liberal ethic." He asserts that "the liberal dimensions of [U.S.] tradition have crowded out
the republican dimensions, with adverse consequences for the democratic prospect and the
legitimacy of the regime." Sandel, supra, note 131 at 85. The "rights-based liberal ethic" is

vindicated, primarily, by the institution of review.
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excluding a republican counterpoint, liberalism has been the
dominant norm in American constitutional culture.
l1 7
E. JudicialReview: The Least Dangerous Branch
I am moved ... by a sense of the ultimate futility of the quest for an Archimedean
point outside ourselves from which the legitimacy of some form of judicial review
or constitutional exegesis may be affirmed .... lbut] in matters of power, the end of
doubt and disaust is the beginning of oranny.1 8

Over the last two hundred years the American conception of
constitutional liberty has evolved primarily, though not exclusively,
through the institution of judicial review. It is vital to note, at the
outset, that review is based on a distrust of authority. Paradoxically,
however, at the same time as explaining why judicial review is
considered necessary, this distrust also demonstrates why it can
never be conceptually legitimate.
Separation of powers theory assumed that relations between the
branches would be largely self-executing.1 39 Questions about
enforcement of the Constitution were bound to arise before long,
though, and in 1803, the Supreme Court appropriated the power to
review the actions of its co-equal branches. 140
Once having
exercised a power of review in a separation of powers context, the

137Supra, note 107 at 465. See infra, note 152.
138

L

Tribe, Constitutional Choices (U.S.A.: Harvard University Press, 1985) at 7

(emphasis added).
139

Separation theory assumed that there was no need of additional mechanisms to resolve
conflicts between branches of the government. The Constitution detailed the jurisdiction of
each branch, thereby limiting the respective powers of each; moreover, the purpose of the
text's system of checks and balances was to harness the ambitions of any branch which sought
to exceed its authority. As an additional precaution, a bill of rights strictly prohibiting the
federal government's interference with certain freedoms was added. Because most of the states
had established republican government through written constitutions, the federal Constitution
did not address relations between individuals and their states.
140
1n Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), Chief Justice Marshall held that the
incoming Jefferson administration acted illegally in refusing to honour a partisan judicial
appointment made by the outgoing Adams administration, but then denied relief because the
congressional statute conferring original jurisdiction was unconstitutional. Even though there
was no explicit textual basis for doing so, the Court asserted its institutional authority over
both the executive and legislative branches.
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Court extended that power over the states 41 Even so, state
autonomy remained the norm in the years leading up to the Civil
War, and federal relations were characterized by extreme distrust as
state governments disputed the locus of sovereignty in the federal
union.1 42 For that reason, the Court's decisions dealt less often with
relations between the individual and the state than with issues
touching relations between national institutions and the states, or
among the states themselves.143

By giving individuals the right to invoke the federal
Constitution against the states, the Civil War amendments provided44
1
a new forum for the expression of hostility toward the state.
This hostility gained momentum in the late nineteenth century as
state legislatures addressed the problems caused by massive
economic expansion and industrialization. Relying on natural law
theory, proponents of laissez-faire capitalism invoked the
Constitution to challenge the state's authority to pass legislation
interfering with economic liberty.145 In the years between 1897 and
141In Fletcherv. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (1810), the Court invalidated a state statute, and then,
over intense objection from the states, declared its authority to supervise the state justice
systems. Martin v. Hunter'sLessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816) and Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264

(1821).
142As Tribe observes, explicit limitations on government authority were minimal in this
period because "it was believed that personal freedom could be secured more effectively by
decentralization than by express command." Supra, note 66 at 2.
143At the same time, however, the contract clause generated a jurisprudence securing the
integrity of contractual obligations. See, for example, The Tnustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (1819) (invalidating state legislation superseding a Crown Charter
establishing Dartmouth College and providing for its governance).
144Because the American Constitution presupposes the retention of state autonomy, and
the first ten amendments did not apply to the states, there was little bill of rights jurisprudence
prior to the Civil War amendments. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
Following the Civil War, the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments imposed federal
limitations on the states' authority to interfere with individual freedom. Supra,note 42. Though
the war did not dissolve the distrust affecting federal-state relations, it at least perpetuated the
union. Subsequently, by entrenching new individual rights, the Civil War amendments deflected
attention from issues of federalism to questions about relations between individuals and the
state.
14 5
The first case under the Civil War amendments was the SlaughterHouse Cases, 16 Wall.
36 (1873), in which butchers challenged Louisiana legislation creating a monopoly in the
slaughterhouse business on the ground that it interfered with their natural right of free labour.
Over dissenting opinions, the Court dismissed their claim; in the next twenty-five years,
however, litigants persistently challenged the state's authority to regulate an individual's
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1937, the Court protected laissez-faire individualism from state

regulatory authority, at times with undisguised fervour. The Court's
decisions in this period often revealed a regard for individualism
which was based on a profound rejection of majoritarian
authority.14 6 By the 1930s, constitutional interpretation would
effectively rob the state of its authority to address the socio-

economic problems arising from the Depression.1 47 The Court's
obstruction of state regulatory authority caused a constitutional crisis
by provoking President Roosevelt's introduction of a "court-packing"

proposal early in 1937!48
The legitimacy of review had been tenuous since Marbwy v.
Madison. Given a written constitution rationalized by a separation
of powers, the absence of any explicit authorization for judicial
review made the exercise of such an exceptional power inescapably
problematic. Nonetheless, Chief Justice Marshall's prestige, the
rhetorical force of Marbury v. Madison, and the appeal to a written
constitution as supreme law all helped to secure the legitimacy of
review 1 9 Neither a written constitution nor the separation of

property right in his labour. By the turn of the century, the Court's conclusion that the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause protected liberty of contract would recognize this
right. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
146The following passage is symptomatic: 'To sustain the individual freedom of action
contemplated by the Constitution, is not to strike down the common good but to exalt it; for
surely the good of society ... cannot be better served than by the preservation against arbitrary
restraint of the liberties of its constituent members." Adkins v. Children'sHospital,261 U.S. 525
(1923) at 561.
147
1n the 1920s and early years of the Depression, by invalidating more than two hundred
state measures, as well as virtually all of the Roosevelt administration's New Deal programs,
Supreme Court decision making became so debilitating of legislative power as effectively to
cripple the state's regulatory authority. By the summer of 1936, President Roosevelt would
declare that the Court had created a "no man's land," in which no government, federal or state,
possessed the authority to regulate the economy. Quoted in W. Leuchtenburg, "The Origins of
Franklin D. Roosevelt's 'Court-Packing' Plan" (1966) Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 347 at 378.
148

For an account of the events leading up to the crisis, see ibid.

149As Chief Justice Marshall argued:
To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation
committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended
to be restrained?...
The constitution is either a superior, paramount law,.., or it is on a level with
ordinary legislative acts,... and is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter
it.
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powers was sufficient to eliminate the risk that power might be
abused; hence the perception, which continues to this day, that
"government cannot be relied upon to behave voluntarily as the
Constitution demands."150 If the branches of government would not
respect the Constitution, some institutional mechanism for
compelling that respect had to be found.151 Trust was reposed in
the judiciary, as guardians of the law and "least dangerous
branch."152 Over time, however, as the Court appropriated more
authority, it became less credible as the least dangerous branch.
The lack of any explicit textual authorization for review also
meant that the Constitution imposed no limitations on the judiciary's
powers. It became clear by the twentieth century that by
vindicating a negative concept of liberty, the courts were effectively
denying legislatures the authority to advance a vision of the modern
regulatory state that would supplant the laissez-faire model of
minimal state intervention. When the Court refused to accept this
emerging concept of the state, the distrust traditionally aimed at
other sources of authority was directed against the judiciary. Once
again this distrust derived from the negative ideology of early
constitutionalism: the fear of a source of authority, which in being
removed from the people and unaccountable to them, was
effectively unlimited 53 By denying majoritarian power and thereby
displacing the emerging faith in democratic progressivism, judicial

If the former ... be true, then a legislative act contrary to the constitution is not law;,
if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part

of the people, to limit a power, in its own nature illimitable.
Marbiry v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803) at 176-77.
150

Tribe, supra, note 66 at 9.

1 51

.Mheformative experiences of [U.S.] colonial and post-independence periods were not
calculated to instill trust in executive or legislative fidelity ... to constitutionally established
boundaries on authority." Tribe, ibid..
152

This expression derives from Federalist#78, supra, note 107 at 465, in which Alexander

Hamilton declared that the judiciary "will always be the least dangerous to the political rights
of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them."
153This distrust recalls republican values, but also strikes a chord with modern liberalism
which draws a distinction between economic and non-economic liberty, and redefines
individualism in terms that largely exclude laissez-faire values. See infra, note 157.
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review exposed the tyrannical authority of an institution whose
function it was to prevent tyranny.
In 1937, President Roosevelt addressed the problem of
government by judiciary with his court-packing proposal. That
spring,

the Supreme

Court

narrowly

averted

the

disastrous

institutional consequences of overt executive interference with its
composition by abandoning the dogmas on which its defense of
economic liberty was based.1 54 Thus the Court refuted the doctrines
previously applied to preclude interference with laissez-faire values
and accepted the state's hegemony in the sphere of economic

regulation. ss By recognizing the state's authority to pursue its
conception of the general welfare at the expense of laissez-faire
individualism, the Court accepted a vision which preferred
democratic, republican values over those of economic liberalism.
It is generally accepted that the institution of review protected
individual liberty in a highly selective manner throughout this
period.1 5 6 The judiciary's vindication of individual liberty did not

disappear, however, with the fundamental re-alignment of ideology
caused by the court-packing plan. The self-abnegation precipitated

by the crisis was also selective because increasingly after 1937, the
157
judiciary applied its authority to protect non-economic liberty.
Today, individual liberty prevails over state authority on a range of
important issues, including privacy and autonomy, the communicative

154See, for example, West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)(upholding state
minimum wage legislation); NationalLabor RelationsBoardv. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937)(upholding federal regulation of labor relations); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548 (1937) (sustaining federal unemployment compensation); and Helvering v. Davis,
301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding federal old age benefits legislation). For an account of the court
crisis and of the Supreme Court's reversals, see Mason, supra, note 30 at 74-128.
1551n United States v. Carolene ProductsCo., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), Justice Stone explicitly
stated that the Court would defer to the legislature's judgment on questions of economic
regulation.
156In the early twentieth century, the judiciary did little to protect non-economic libertynot only was this the era of separate but equal, supra, note 44; additionally, until the 1930s, the
Supreme Court extended little or no constitutional protection to radicals prosecuted for their
radical or unpopular speech. See generally Chafee, supra, note 47.
15 7 Liberal constitutionalism's post crisis double standard is analyzed by R. McCloskey in
"Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial" (1962) Sup. Ct.
Rev. 584.
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rights of the first amendment, and the procedural guarantees
applicable in the criminal justice system.
Doctrinal solutions continue to reflect the traditional distrust of
state authority. In the first instance, the denial of individual rights
is often judged by a standard of review which is hostile, rather than
deferential, to the state's authority."5
For example, in the
problematic area of privacy and autonomy, the Court has set
rigorous standards to prevent state interference with a woman's right
to procure an abortion 59 This distrust also characterizes much of
the jurisprudence dealing with the state's administration of the
criminal justice system. It is most manifest, however, in the Court's
first amendment jurisprudence. Patently distrustful of any merger
between religious and political authority, the Court has decreed that
a strict "wall of separation" between church and state be
maintained. 1 ° In addition, the speech clause denies the state the
authority to regulate a wide range of communicative activities.1 61 It
158

See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (articulating the doctrinal requirements of
"strict scrutiny"). Though strict scrutiny had its genesis in the Supreme Court's review of race
discrimination laws and does not govern in all cases, "heightened" scrutiny is applied in other
branches of equal protection jurisprudence dealing, for example, with classifications based on
gender, alienage, and certain types of disadvantage. Moreover, the standards developed to judge
equality cases have cross-fertilized other areas of constitutional adjudication. See Police Dep't
of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (extending strict scrutiny to first amendment review
of content distinctions), Heffron v. Int'l Society for Krishna Consciousness,452 U.S. 640 (1981)
(applying a specialized form of heightened scrutiny to public forum issues), and Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny to state interferences with the right to procure an
abortion).
159

Roe v. Wade denies the state the authority to deny an abortion in the first trimester of
a pregnancy, and strictly prohibits the state from adopting regulations which would burden this
right in the second trimester. Only in the third trimester is the legitimacy of the state's interest
in prohibiting abortions recognized. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The subsequent case law dealing with
the constitutionality of provisions regulating abortion procedures makes it plain that the Court
will not tolerate any official interference with an individual's right to seek an abortion. See, for
example, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetriciansand Gynecologists, 106 S.Ct. 2169
(1986).
1 60

See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1946). Although different rationales are
offered to support this wall of separation, each is directed to power, and to the corruption of
either temporal or spiritual authority that might occur from any merger. For a discussion, see
Tribe, supra, note 66 at 1158-66.
1 61

The general principle is that content regulations areperse impermissible, and can only
be justified according to a strict standard of review. PoliceDep't of Chicagov. Mosely, 408 U.S.
113 (1973). Content regulations are impermissible because to allow the state the authority to
regulate speech on the basis of its content would be to surrender censorial control. As a result,
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is the press clause, however, which, by reference to the "checking
function," relies most heavily on a distrust of authority to support its
conception of liberty.16 2
Throughout this jurisprudence the original conception, which

expresses a hostile attitude toward the state through an atomistic
conception of liberty, remains a pervasive theme. Even though the

judiciary declines to challenge the state's authority on a variety of
current regulatory issues, American constitutionalism is still
characterized by a conception of liberty which is rooted in a distrust
of authority. Because the judiciary enforces this conception of the
state, review is inescapably controversial.
A conflict between individual freedom and state authority is
common to all democratic systems of government.

In substantive

terms, however, that conflict is irresolvable because no general
theory can determine how the competing claims of liberty and
authority should be reconciled in discrete cases. Limitations on
majoritarian power can only be identified by recognizing the
demands of individualism, and by the same token, restrictions on
individual liberty can only be articulated by reference to some

the state lacks authority to regulate speech activities which are disagreeable or offensive. Thus
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) concludes that "we cannot indulge the facile assumption
that one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing
ideas" and that "governments [could] seize upon the censorship of particular words as a
convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular views."
This principle does not apply to some categories of speech, such as obscenity, which fall
outside the first amendment's protection of speech, or other categories, such as commercial
speech, which are governed by a more deferential standard of review. Nonetheless, this
neutrality denies the state the authority to regulate speech on the basis of its content, unless
a patent harm or other special circumstances are present. As such, it is based on a profound
distrust, which refuses to permit the state to make value judgments about the respective merits
of different categories of speech and viewpoints. American constitutional culture considers such
a power censorial.
162
See generally V. Blasi, "The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory" (1977) A.B.F.
Res. J. 521. Blasi argues, at 538, that one of the most important values attributed to a free
press by eighteenth-century political thinkers was "that of checking the inherent tendency of
government officials to abuse the power entrusted to them." He concludes that because those
views continue to have contemporary relevance, the checking value "rests on a most impressive
foundation."
Much of the first amendment jurisprudence on press issues supports this view. In order to
prevent censorial interference and protect the press's unique role as watchdog, content control
of the media is permitted in limited circumstances only, prior restraints are per se
unconstitutional, even where publication may threaten legitimate state interests; and, because
of the imperative need to encourage robust debate about public issues, the defamation of
public officials is constitutionally protected.
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notion of the permissible scope of authority. Any definition of
individual liberty must therefore be contingent on a concept of state
authority and likewise, any definition of the state's authority will be
limited by a concept of individual liberty.1 63 It is impossible to
derive an abstract theory that prescribes a "correct" balance between
freedom and authority. Every normative theory is inherently
subjective, inescapably arbitrary, and unalterably oblivious to
particular circumstances. 164
In a parliamentary democracy, majoritarian institutions bear the
responsibility for accommodating individual freedom and state
authority. Thus is this perennial conflict resolved through a
conception of institutional role; legislative majorities seek vindication
of their power to settle the delicate balance between liberty and
authority in successive democratic elections. In the United States,
however, this conflict is not resolved through democratic choice, but
replayed as a conflict between the judiciary and the legislatures.
Thus the American system compounds the substantive conflict
between individual freedom and state authority through its overlay
of institutional conflict.
Judicial review is inescapably controversial because it is
conceptually incapable of resolving either the substantive or
institutional conflict. As already observed, it is impossible to
articulate a substantive theory which will determine, in abstract,
neutral or unarbitrary terms, either what liberty is, or how much
authority the state should have. Second, and more important, the
contours of the judiciary's authority to engage in this exercise are
completely unknown. The power of review is limited only by some
vague code of self-restraint. 16s In the end, no substantive theory of

163As Mark Tushnet puts it, [Liberal constitutionalism] is inevitably incomplete, for it
proves unable to provide a constitutional theory of the sort that it demands without depending
on communitarian assumptions that contradict its fundamental individualism." "Following the
Rules," supra, note 35 at 785.
164"Each version of the Grand Theory is incoherent ... [because] under the guise of limiting

arbitrariness ... each introduces its own arbitrariness." Moreover, "[t]here is no reason to
believe that any normative theory ... will resolve the contradiction." See Tushnet,
Dilemmas," supra, note 35 at 416.

The

16S"Mhe only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense
of self-restraint."
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (Justice Stone, dissenting opinion).
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constitutional liberty is articulable, and accordingly established
limitations on the institutional authority of the judiciary do not exist.
Putting historical experience together with theoretical incertitude, it
becomes conceptually irrational to believe that liberty depends for
its preservation on a system of constitutional rights and judicial
review.
Americans proceed in agonizing search for the theoretical elixir
which will resolve these dilemmas. But by distrusting authority,
whether it be executive, legislative or judicial, they have resigned
themselves to constitutional hiatus, which no substantive or
institutional theory of review can fill. While some scholars
articulate theories of review which focus on the substantive conflict
between liberty and authority,166 others concentrate primary
attention on the institutional conflict between the judicial and
legislative branches.1 67 Significantly, whatever the focus, prominent
scholars have recognized the incoherence of review. 168 Thus does
the epic of liberal constitutionalism dissolve. Given its inability to
accept the sovereignty of any source of authority, it is less about any
noble concept of liberty than it is about a dark and unrequited
distrust of authority.169 What remains is a negative ideology, and a
credo which insists that "the end of doubt and distrust is the
170
beginning of tyranny.

166See, for example, P. Bobbitt, ConstitutionalFate (New York, Oxford University Press,
1982); M. Perry, The Constitution,the Courts and Human Rights (New Haven, Yale University
Press, 1982); and Tribe, supra, notes 66 and 138.
167

See, for example, A. Bickel, TheLeast DangerousBranch(New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co.,
1962); J. Choper, Judicial Review and the National PoliticalProcess (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1980); and Ely, supra, note 35.
168
Tribe expressed it well, stating that "[w]hen it comes to legitimacy, all has been said
already, and what has been said is all so deeply riddled with problems that it seems hardly
worth restating, much less refuting or refining." Supra, note 138 at 3.

169"American constitutionalists [are profoundly pessimistic.] [To them] [t)here is a feudal
bleakness about man which sees him fit only for external domination, and there is a liberal
bleakness about man which sees him working autonomously on the basis of his own self-

interest." Hartz, supra, note 20 at 80.
170Supra, note 138.
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V. MELANCHOLY REFLECTIONS

It is a melancholy reflection that liberty should be equally exposed to danger
whether the Government have too much or too little power, and that thi nc which
divides these extremes should be so inaccurately defined by experience.

The foregoing account demonstrated that the idea of
constitutional liberty will inevitably be defined in terms that are
cultural rather than abstract. To recall the comparative analysis of
Part III, both American and British ideologies have their roots in
struggles about power. In Britain, Parliament struggled to establish
unfettered authority, whereas in the United States, Americans
resisted sources of authority. Thus has context conditioned their
respective concepts of constitutional liberty. For that reason, each
may consider the other irrational. The British find review a bizarre
mechanism for controlling power because the judiciary is
unaccountable for the way in which it exercises its authority. At the
same time, Americans cannot fathom the principle of parliamentary
supremacy. Though the British insist that theirs is a system of
constitutional freedom, the only measure of liberty is what
Parliament actually does. To oversimplify, in the United States
constitutional liberty is whatever the judges
say it is,1 72 and in
1 73
is.
it
says
Britain it is whatever Parliament
Hence the melancholy reflection that liberty remains fragile, no
matter what the institutional arrangements for its preservation are.
Democracies make grave errors, and make them often. Even so,
malaise with democratic process may not be a sufficient reason for
adopting a system of constitutional rights which transfers the
responsibility for making political decisions to the judiciary.
Although Americans present their system of constitutional rights and

171

Kammen, supra, note 13 at 50 (quoting James Madison).

172

1n 1907, Charles Evans Hughes declared that "[w]e are under a Constitution, but the

Constitution is what the judges say it is." Quoted in Mason, supra, note 30 at 126.
'73Supra, note 55.
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judicial review as a model of liberty and equality, their experience
reveals few reasons to agree with such a claim 74 True enough, in
a perfect world the judiciary might graciously correct the
misjudgments of democratic majorities. But in a perfect world, the
democratic process would not misfire. In the end, it may be no less
irrational to trust the judiciary than it is to trust legislative
majorities.1 75 The reality is that "rights review" imposes impossible
expectations on the judiciary, and because of the institutional
consequences of constitutional interpretation, "bad" decisions can
often be more damaging and less easily reversed than "bad"
legislation.1 7 6 The point here is not to weigh the merits of one
ideology against the other. At the same time, however, it is not
necessary to glamourize parliamentary supremacy to question the
wisdom of including a system of constitutional rights at this stage.
When they embraced the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
Canadians made certain assumptions and asked the wrong questions.
The relevant question was not whether our mixed system of
division-of-powers review and parliamentary supremacy is ideal, but
rather, whether and how our political ideology would be affected,
both beneficially and adversely, by the introduction of constitutional
rights. As one of our forefathers so wisely observed during the
Confederation debates of 1865, "[the u.s. Constitution] may be a
failure for us, paradoxically as it may seem, and yet not a failure for
them."1 77

174As Tribe explains, a relatively large role for the judiciary is acceptable "more because
it has become an historical given than because any ineluctable logic would have made an
alternative course of history unthinkable or patently unwise." Supra, note 66 at 15.
175As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson so aptly put it: "We are not final
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final." Quoted in Mason,
supra, note 30 at x.
176

Recognizing this prospect, Justice Jackson refused, in Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944), to approve the internment of Japanese Americans, concluding (at 246) that
"once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order..., the Court for all time has validated the
principle of racial discrimination." He declared (at 244) that "if we cannot confine military
expedients by the Constitution, neither would I distort the Constitution to approve all that the
military may deem expedient."
177ParliamentaryDebates on the Subject of Confederation (Quebec: Hunter, Rose & Co.,
1865) at 145 (quoting D'Arcy McGee).
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In institutional terms, it is doubtful that a bill of rights is either
a necessary or a sufficient condition for the improvement of the
human condition. Though scores of nations have bills of rights
replicating the American model, Canadians would likely recoil from
the concept of constitutional liberty that prevails in many of them.
Even more tellingly, American experience itself reveals flaws in the
Constitution's blueprint for liberty. As Madison declared, "a mere
demarcation on parchment" is not a sufficient guard against
tyranny.1 78 Judicial review might be less tyrannical than majority
rule, but it can also be more tyrannical. Indeed, a system of
constitutional rights and judicial review may even be detrimental to
the political process, because it tends to "dwarf the political capacity
of the people." When "the correction of legislative mistakes comes
from the outside," the people lose the "political experience, and the
moral education that comes from fighting the question out in the
ordinary way, and correcting their own errors."179 In the end, any
claim that the preservation of liberty requires constitutional rights
and judicial review is open to serious question.
Not only is it unclear that the institutions surrounding a bill of
rights are necessary for liberty to flourish, it is also far from
apparent that America's substantive definition of liberty constitutes
self-evident truth, or even a truth that resonates with Canadian
values. Rooted as it is in eighteenth-century ideology and in a
disinctive attachment to individualist values, this definition of liberty
is still predominantly negative. It rests on an excessive individualism
and a hostile conception of the state, both which, on further
exploration, may be revealed as largely foreign to Canadian
constitutional ideology.
In the end, the case against a system of constitutional rights can
be put in terms that are both experiential and ideological. In 1982,
Canada endorsed American constitutional ideology by introducing a
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Though it was not apparent then,
events may reveal the Charter to be as much like black magic as
magic.
178
178Federalist#48, supra, note 107 at 313.
1 79

J.B. Thayer, John Marshall (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1901) at 106-07.
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VI. CONCLUSION
You say you want a revolution, well you know;, we all want to change the world ...
You say you'll change the constitution, well you know;, we all want to change your
head. 3g tell me it's the institution, well you know;, You better free your mind
instead

Following the negotiation of the patriation package in
November of 1981, a senior official observed "[w]hat exactly we are
entrenching we don't know."181 At the least, we should realize by
now that the Charter is impure. In institutional terms if not in
substance, what we entrenched is American constitutional ideology.
Thus does the Charter perpetuate the perennial dilemma of
Canadian identity: that "there could not be a Canada without the
United States - and may not be a Canada with one."182 Although
the inescapable reality is that the Constitution will never be purely
Canadian, it can be distinctly Canadian. To attain that objective, we
must shed the romantic misconceptions we hold about the norms of
American constitutionalism.
The most important lesson to learn from U.S. experience is that
neither a bill of rights nor judicial review is a panacea for the ageold conflict between liberty and authority. A democratic community
cannot escape its responsibility to confront that conflict by deflecting
it to an unelected and unaccountable judiciary. As the American
experience reveals, the institution of review simply raises questions
about the extent and propriety of that delegation of democratic
authority. The point is that we cannot expect the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms to depoliticize difficult conflicts between freedom and
authority, or cure disenchantment with the political process, and we

180J. Lennon and P. McCartney, "Revolution 1" (G.B.: Apple Records Inc., 1968). I am
certain that my decision to use these lines predated the highly publicized Nike ad campaign. In
any case, they apply more tellingly, in my view, to Canada's newly improved Constitution than
they do to Nike's new line of racing shoes.
181
Quoted in I. Anderson, 'The Unfinished Charter" Maclean's (30 November 1981) 26 at
27.
1 82

J.M.S. Careless, "Horray for the Scars and Gripes" in Purdy, supra, note 1, 132 at 134.
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should not let it become a forum for indulging sensibilities which
seek a return to an erstwhile age of individual hegemonism.
Additionally, though, Canada should recognize that it is just as
mistaken to understate the differences between American and
Canadian ideology as it is to overstate those differences. Ideological
differences do exist, and in giving the Charter life, their relevance
must be assessed. Instead of idolizing American constitutional
ideology, or blithely pretending that it is not what the Charter is
about, Canada should be prepared to explore it, examining the
elements which synchronize with our own, and rejecting those which
do not.
By now it is somewhat beside the point to complain that the
purity of our constitutional system has been compromised by the
adoption of an American-style bill of rights.18 3 Whatever "purity" is,
Canada's constitutional ideology has always borrowed: it is the
ability to adapt that has made our tradition both indigeneous and
distinctive. That means, therefore, that it is appropriate, in debating
Charter interpretation, to voice deep skepticism about the
assumptions of American constitutional ideology and to question the
infusion of American substantive norms. That process of adaptation
is a necessary part of the Charter's ideological agenda. Whatever
may be said today about the decision to adopt the Charter, Canada's
entrenched rights will truly become a "charter of wrongs" if our
diffidence makes us more "yankee" than we would choose to
become. As Miss Nibsmith entreats, "wake up! Be yourself, not a
184
bad copy of something else."

183Supra note 4.
1
84The following conversation between Miss Nibsmith, a British governess, and Francis
Cornish, a Canadian artist, took place during World War I.
NIBSMITH:
...
Well, it relieves me that you're not just a lost American wandering around in a
fogCORNISH:
I'm not an American, damn it! I'm a Canadian....
NIBSMITH:
Sorry, sorry, sorry! Of course you're a Canadian. Do you know what that is? A
psychological mess.... Wake up! Be yourself, not a bad copy of something else!
R. Davies, What's Bred in the Bone (Toronto: MacMillan, 1985) at 312.

